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As a result of the financial market globalization during the last two decades, the conventional barriers 
between financial activities have diminished. This led to the emergence of financial holdings that operate 
both in the banking sector and on the stock and insurance markets, which provide the whole range of 
financial services. The consequence of this tendency is the increasing concern towards the identification of 
optimal institutional structures responsible for the regulation and supervision of the financial market. The 
aim of this article is to analyze the models for financial market regulation and supervision. We discuss the 
effect of European integration on prudential supervision in European Union. Finally, we examine the 
model of financial supervision in Romania. 
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Introduction 
In the last years of 20th century, the conventional obstacles separating financial activities have 
weaken due to the increasing level of integration of the financial markets. Thus, the number of 
financial  holdings  working  in  all  segments  of  the  financial  market  (banking,  finance  and 
insurance) has risen. These evolutions caused the strengthening in the debates concerning the 
most favorable institutional structures for the regulation and supervision of the financial system.  
Specialized  literature  on  this  issue  offers  arguments  both  in  favor  of  an  integrated  financial 
supervision, carrying out by a single regulatory and supervisory authority empowered to regulate 
and supervise all the categories of financial institutions, and in favor of a traditional supervision 
in which specialized authorities supervise separately banks, insurance companies and securities 
markets. Even so, the current developments in the financial sector show a tendency towards 
consolidated  supervision.  Consolidated  supervision  is  applied  in  many  countries  under  the 
influence of factors such as: the globalization of the financial markets and a greater degree of 
integration of the companies providing financial services; the weakness of the financial sector 
that caused the collapse of some financial institutions and serious crises of the financial markets, 
as well as changes in the responsibilities of central banks
282. 
The supporters of consolidated supervision argue that the expansion of financial institutions in 
multiple areas of activities requires strict and responsible supervision. Nowadays, consolidated 
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financial  supervision  is  implemented  in  many  developed  countries  such  as:  Australia,  Great 
Britain, Canada, Japan, Germany, France, Austria, Ireland, the Scandinavian countries, etc.  
It  has  been  also  successfully  implemented  in  emerging  countries  among  which  we  mention: 
South Korea, Hungary, Poland, Latvia and Estonia. 
 
1. Models for financial market regulation and supervision  
The financial market traditionally includes banking, financial and insurance sectors. It can be 
seen as an economic space within diverse operators as banks, financial intermediaries, mutual 
funds,  insurance  firms,  pension  funds,  provide  financial  instruments  and  services.  There  are 
different  regulatory  agencies  for  banks  (often  central  bank),  securities  firms  and  insurance 
companies  at  national  and  international  level  (Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision, 
International Organization of Securities Commissions, IOSCO, and the International Association 
of Insurance Supervisors, IAIS). Financial market regulation aims three major objectives
283:  
  1. the pursuit of macroeconomic and microeconomic stability; 
  2. the transparency in the market and of intermediaries and investor protection; 
  3. the safeguarding and promotion of competition in the financial intermediation sector. 
Di  Giorgio  and  Di  Noia  (2000)  identified  four  approaches  for  financial  regulation  and 
supervision:  institutional  supervision,  supervision  by  objectives,  functional  supervision,  and 
single regulator-supervision
284.  
 
1.1. Institutional supervision  
In this approach, which follows the traditional segmentation of the financial market into three 
markets  (banking,  securities  and  insurance),  the  oversight  is  realized  through  three  different 
supervisory authorities. These authorities control operators and markets mainly through access 
selection  on  the  market,  regular  monitoring  of  the  activities  developed  by  the  authorised 
operators and exits from the market. 
 
1.2. Supervision by objectives 
According to this approach, all intermediaries and markets should be subject to the supervision of 
more than one authority, each single authority being in charge for one objective of regulation in 
spite of both the legal form of the intermediaries and of the functions or activities they carry out. 
Thus, there should function three authorities, other than the central bank – which is accountable 
for monetary policy and macro-stability –, each of them being responsible of one of the three 
objectives of regulation, above-mentioned.  
 
1.3. Functional supervision 
This model, also known as supervision “by activity”, take into account the functions performed 
by the financial system such as clearing and settling payments, pooling of resources and portfolio 
diversification,  transferring  economic  resources,  managing  risks,  coordinating  decentralized 
decisions and dealing with incentive problems. In view of this model, each type of financial 
services should be regulated by a given authority independently of the operators (banks, mutual 
funds, intermediation firms, insurance companies and other financial intermediaries) who offer it.  
 
1.4. Single regulator-supervision 
This approach is founded on just a single supervisory authority, separated from central bank, 
responsible  for  all  markets  and  intermediaries  operating  in  banking,  financial  or  insurance 
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system.  This  authority  should  be  preoccupied  with  all  the  objectives  of  regulation:  stability, 
transparency and investor protection, possibly competition.  
The dominant model applied at the international level was institutional supervision, but recently 
the integrated financial supervision has gain an important role. The comparative advantages of 
these two dominant models are presented in the table below. 
 
Table 1. Comparative advantages of the dominant models in financial supervision 
Integrated financial supervisor  Specialist supervisor 
-  lower  costs,  regulatory  neutrality  and 
pooling of expertise 
-  better  collaboration  between  sectoral 
supervisors which leads to a single team of 
experts and a single rule book 
-  higher  transparency  and  economies  of 
scale 
- higher specialization, more clear tasks and 
more competitive 
-  better  knowledge  and  adaptation  to  the 
risk profile of the regulated financial sector 
 
Source: Lannoo K. (2002), p.4 
 
In spite of the existence of these four models, the structure of financial supervision was usually 
based  on  the  division  of  the  financial  sector  in  three  segments:  banks,  securities  firms  and 
insurance companies, each of them having its own distinct specialist supervisory authority. In the 
early ‘90s some countries have switch to the integrated supervision of financial market, adopting 
a single supervision authority (see table 2). The first integrated financial supervisory authority 
was created in Norway, which integrated bank and insurance supervision in 1986, followed by 
Denmark in 1988 and Sweden in 1992
285. 
The most notorious example of integrated supervision is UK Financial Services Authority (FSA), 
created in 1997, a single supervision authority, which came fully into effect only in 2001, after 
the  enforcement  of  Financial  Services  and  Market  Acts  2000.  FSA  has  four  statutory 
objectives
286: 
  - to keep the confidence of the public in financial system; 
  - to support public understanding of the financial system; 
  - to assure an adequate level of customer protection ; 
  - to diminish the financial crime. 
Its example was followed by several countries such as Iceland, Japan, Korea, Hungary, Latvia, 
Estonia, Austria, Germany, Ireland, and Poland (see table 3).  
 
Table 2: Financial Supervision in the EU in 2000 
Country  Banking  Securities  Insurance 
 
Belgium  BS  BS  I 
Denmark  U  U  U 
Germany  B  B,S  I 
Greece  CB  S  I 
Ireland  CB  CB  G 
Italy  CB  CB,S  I 
Luxembourg  BS  BS  I 
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Country  Banking  Securities  Insurance 
 
France  B, CB  B,S  I 
Spain  CB  S  I 
Netherlands  CB  CB,S  I 
Portugal  CB  CB,S  I 
Austria  G  G  G 
Finland  BS  BS  I 
Sweden  U  U  U 
United Kingdom  U  U  U 
Norway  U  U  U 
Source: Di Giorgio G., Di Noia C. (2000), p. 17 
Legenda: CB: central bank, BS: banking and securities supervisor, B: banking supervisor,  
S: securities supervisor, I: insurance supervisor, G: government department,  
U: single financial supervisor 
 
Table 2: Financial Supervision in the EU in 2008 
Country  Banking  Securities  Insurance 
 
Belgium  U  U  U 
Denmark  U  U  U 
Germany  U  U  U 
Greece  CB  S  G 
Ireland  U  U  U 
Italy  CB  S  I 
Luxembourg  BS  BS  I 
Spain  CB  S  I 
Netherlands  CB  S  CB 
Portugal  CB  S  I 
Austria  U  U  U 
Finland  BS  BS  I 
Sweden  U  U  U 
United Kingdom  U  U  U 
Poland  U  U  U 
Hungary  U  U  U 
France  B, CB  S  I 
Latvia  U  U  U 
Malta  U  U  U 
Estonia  U  U  U 
Norway  U  U  U 
Source: Enrico Maria Cervellati∗- Eleonora Fioriti, www.ecb.int, central banks’ sites  
 
2. Prudential supervision in European Union 
ECB  considers  that  three  important  responsibilities  should  be  included  in  the  supervision 
functions  of  EU  member  states
287:  1)  investor  protection  activities;  2)  micro-prudential 
supervision,  and  3)  macro-prudential  analysis.  The  opinion  of  ECB  regarding  the  prudential 
supervision is the maintenance of an essential role for national central banks in this domain in the 
                                                       
287 European Central Bank, The role of central banks in prudential supervision, 2001, p.3. 497 
 
countries from euro zone. All central banks are responsible, somehow, by the macro-prudential 
analysis,  even  if  they  rarely  respond  for  investors’  protection,  particularly  in  the  securities 
market.  
There are arguments both for and against combining prudential supervision with the monetary 
policy  responsibilities  at  the  level  of  central  bank
288.  Three  important  arguments  sustain  the 
unification: 1) central bank’s ability to get important insights about the general situation of the 
economy,  since  monetary  policy  and  banking  supervision  are  closely  interrelated;  2)  central 
bank’s capacity to protect the payment system, a key channel for the potential dispersion of 
contagion  risk;  3)  central  bank’s  involvement  in  assuring  the  systemic  stability  of  financial 
system.  By  contrast,  there  are  three  strong  arguments  for  the  separation  by  granting  wide 
supervisory  powers  to  a  single  institution  outside  of  central  bank:  1)  the  potential  trade-off 
between monetary stability and micro-stability of financial institutions; 2) the higher reputation 
costs for central bank in the case of the bank failure, which will influence the credibility of 
monetary policy; 3) the conflict between the pro-cyclical effects of micro policy (regulatory) and 
counter-cyclical effects of macro policy (monetary).  
Recent developments of the financial system require for an single supervisor. Di Giorgio and Di 
Noia  (1999)  proposed  the  establishment  of  an  independent  European  System  of  Financial 
Supervisors (ESFS) structure similar to the European System of Central Banks
289. In 2000, the 
authors  have  conceived  a “four-peak”  model,  in  which the four  institutions  would  share  the 
responsibility of regulation
290:  
  1) Central bank would be in charge of price and macroeconomic stability, continuing to 
perform the task of monetary policy and lender of last resort;  
  2) A second institution, which should closely cooperate with the central bank, would be 
responsible for micro-stability, supervising the whole financial system and managing deposit 
insurance and investor compensation scheme;  
  3) A third agency would be in charge of transparency and investor protection, supervising 
disclosure  requirements  and  the  proper  behavior  of  the  all  banks,  securities  and  insurance 
intermediaries. 
  4) A fourth institution would guarantee fair competition and avoid abuses of dominant 
position and limit dangerous concentrations in banks, securities firms and insurance companies. 
Nowadays, in the context of the financial crisis, the European Commission has speeded up the 
implementation of this project in two stages: stage 1 (2009-2010) – preparation of the ESFS; and 
stage 2 (2011-2012) – establishment of the ESFS. 
 
3. Financial market supervision in Romania 
The  model  of  financial  supervision  in  Romania  has  been  the  institutional  approach.  The 
authorities for the regulation and supervision of the financial system have been: 1) the National 
Bank  of  Romania  (NBR)  for  the  banking  sector;  2)  the  Romanian  National  Securities 
Commission (RNSC) for the stock markets; and 3) the Insurance Supervision Authority (ISA) for 
insurance companies. As a rule, each of the three institutions has a limited control, but each is 
affected by the initiatives coming from the other two domains. That is why these institutions have 
signed a protocol of cooperation in the area of supervision.  
Based on the tendencies manifest both on an international scale and at the EU level, in 2001 the 
Romanian government put forward a proposal for the foundation of an integrated agency for 
financial market supervision, but this idea was considered premature at that time and therefore 
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rejected
291. The opinions of the three authorities on this issue are divided. The NBR seems to be 
the most open to the development of a single supervisory institution since this will allow it not 
only to find irregularities and problems but also to maintain an important role in the activity of 
supervision and sufficient power to intervene in the monetary policy. By contrast, both the RNSC 
and ISA have a tendency towards independence, their main argument being the progress made in 
their consolidation as independent institutions of control at the recommendation of the EU.  
Given that Romania’s integration in the EU became a major objective, beginning with 2005 the 
NBR has switch to consolidated supervision of credit institutions exclusively. Since 2006 the 
NBR has also supervised the activity of the leasing companies, pawnshops, etc.  
Consolidated  banking  supervision  refers  to  the  evaluation  the  financial  position  of  an  entire 
group,  considering  all  the  risk  to  which  the  bank  is  exposed  no  matter  that  these  risks  are 
reflected in the books of the bank or related entities
292.  
 
Conclusions 
The  consolidated  supervision  has  been  the  subject  of  many  controversial  debates  between 
bankers, academics, governors and other officials. The supporters of consolidated supervision 
argue that the expansion of financial institutions in multiple areas of activities requires strict and 
responsible supervision and indeed the consolidated supervision have proved its success in many 
countries. At a European level a more flexible supervisory framework must be conceived in order 
to  prevent  financial  instability  and  to  keep  up  with  the  increasing  number  of  cross-border 
financial groups, markets’ developments and interrelationships. The current financial crises have 
shown that the regulators and supervisors have ignored the cross-sector propagation of risk. The 
European Commission is preparing the construction and regulation of a new entity, namely the 
European  System  of  Financial  Supervisors,  meant  to  ensure  a  more  competitive  supervisory 
framework. The consolidated European supervision can play an important part in the reform of 
the international financial system architecture. 
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